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Abstract 
Distributed systems with multiple interacting services, such as distributed e-commerce systems, are suitable 
targets for malicious attacks because of the potential financial impact. Intrusion detection in such systems has 
been an active area of research, while the problem of automated response has received relatively less attention. 
The thought often is that a system administrator will be included in the loop for troubleshooting once the alert 
about a possible intrusion has been raised. In this paper, we present the design of automated response mechanisms 
in an intrusion tolerant system called ADEPTS. The particular type of response we focus on enforces containment 
in the system, through which it localizes the effect of the intrusion thus allowing the system to provide service, 
albeit degraded. Containment can be very important in a large class of distributed systems in which a single 
compromised service can affect other services through the mutual interactions. ADEPTS uses a graph of intrusion 
goals, called I-GRAPH as the underlying representation in the system. In response to alerts from an intrusion 
detection framework, ADEPTS executes an algorithm to determine the possible path of spread of the intrusion and 
the appropriate response to deploy. A feedback mechanism evaluates the success of a deployed response and uses 
that in guiding future choices. ADEPTS is demonstrated on a distributed e-commerce system and evaluated using 
the survivability metric whose value depends on the operational services in the face of an intrusion.  
Keywords: automated intrusion response, intrusion containment, e-commerce system, survivability, dependency 
graphs. 
1 Introduction 
Distributed systems comprising multiple services interacting among themselves to provide end-user functions 
are becoming an increasingly important platform for business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) 
systems. As an example, electronic commerce, or e-commerce, has been touted as the next wave in the Internet   2
revolution. The huge financial stakes involved in e-commerce make the distributed system infrastructure 
supporting e-commerce prime candidates for computer security attacks.  
Such motivations have long led to interest in securing distributed systems through detection of intrusions. This 
is typically achieved by analyzing the signatures of incoming packets and either matching them against known 
attack patterns (misuse based signatures), or against patterns of expected system behavior (anomaly based 
signatures). In order to meet the challenges of always-on, on-demand service availability, an e-commerce system 
needs to be resilient to security attacks. Resilience must include both intrusion detection and intrusion response. 
Compared to the problem of detection, automated response has received far less research attention. This has 
typically been considered the domain of system administrators who manually "patch" the system in response to 
detected attacks. However, as networked e-commerce services become ubiquitous and they are often placed in 
environments difficult to reach for human intervention, automated tools for intrusion response gain importance.  
The rudimentary response mechanism often bundled with anti-virus or intrusion detection system (IDS) 
products [36],[37] overwhelmingly consider only immediate local responses that are directly suggested by the 
detected symptom. For example, a file being infected with a virus may cause the anti-virus product to quarantine 
the file and disable all access to the file [48],[49], or a suspect packet being flagged by a network IDS may cause 
the specific network connection to be terminated. While these may be applicable in stand-alone systems, they do 
not account for interaction effects among multiple components. The few available dedicated intrusion response 
systems are found to be lacking in one or more dimensions that make them unsuitable for protecting dynamic and 
complex distributed systems. Some of the commonly observed shortcomings are the system may have a static 
mapping of symptoms from the detector to the response, may not take feedback into account for determining 
future responses, may assume perfect detectors with no missed and no false alarms, or may assume perfect 
success rate for a deployed response. The complex interactions and the complex software running the distributed 
applications, the non-determinism in the execution environment, and the reality of new forms of intrusions 
surfacing would make any one of the above shortcomings fatal for an intrusion response system for a distributed 
enterprise.    3
In this paper, we focus on one of the most important kinds of automated response, namely, containment. 
Containment implies restricting the effect of the intrusion to a subset of the entire set of services, which may 
allow users access to limited functionality of the system. For example, browsing a store catalog and checking on a 
previously placed order may be available, while placing new orders may not be. There are several challenges to 
the problem of containment. First, the systems often have close coupling between the services with frequent 
interactions of different kinds, such as read, write, and execute. This allows a compromised service to spread the 
effect to multiple services. A second challenge is that the existing interactions between e-commerce system 
components should not be substantially altered during normal execution in order to enforce containment during 
periods of intrusion. Examples of unacceptable change may include mandating interactions pass through 
additional checks inlined in the execution path, intermediaries, or be executed over slower channels. Third, the 
system will have to consider the possibility of imperfect detectors providing false alarms or missing alarms, and 
imperfect response actions, which do not have 100% coverage.  
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of an Adaptive Intrusion Tolerant System, ADEPTS, for 
containing intrusions in a distributed system of interacting services. ADEPTS uses an Intrusion-Graph (I-GRAPH) 
to represent paths for the intrusion to spread from one service to its neighbor. Alarms from a detection system, 
which may be off-the-shelf or from our previous work [6], are mapped to the I-GRAPH nodes. ADEPTS estimates 
the likely path of spread of the intrusion from the alarms and the structure of the I-GRAPH and then determines the 
appropriate response(s)  to take. This decision is based on the disruptivity of the response to legitimate system 
activities, the previous success of the response, and the confidence that the determined intrusion is indeed taking 
place. The response has the goal of  preventing the escalation of the intrusion and possible spread from one 
service to another. ADEPTS can function in multiple levels of “paranoia” depending on the policy level, from an 
aggressive mode with an elevated threat perception to a conservative mode.  
The metric used to evaluate an intrusion tolerant system has to be carefully chosen. Low-level metrics, such as 
the latency of detection or false and missed alarm rates do not fully capture the effect of an intrusion on the 
system’s functionality. We propose the use of the metric called survivability [11] for evaluating the effect of 
ADEPTS. We define it such that its value depends on the set of high-level system transactions that can be achieved 
and the set of high-level system goals (e.g., keep users’ private information secure) that are not violated in the   4
event of an intrusion. A high level transaction relies on certain chains of interactions between multiple services 
being functioning. Preserving a high level goal implies thwarting certain intrusion goals from being reached. 
The design of ADEPTS is realized in an implementation which provides intrusion response service to a realistic 
distributed e-commerce system. The e-commerce system mimics an online book store system and two auxiliary 
systems for the warehouse and the bank. Real attack scenarios are injected into the system and ADEPTS’ responses 
are deployed, which bring out the latency of the response action and the adaptive nature of ADEPTS. The 
survivability of the system is compared with no response mechanism, local responses only, and with ADEPTS. 
We believe this paper breaks new ground in the following ways: 
1.  ADEPTS is the first system, to the best of our knowledge, that provides a structured methodology for 
containing intrusions in a distributed system. It is also the first system to aggregate the factors of severity of a 
response, its effectiveness, and the possibility of escalation to determine the appropriate set of responses. 
2.  ADEPTS can handle multiple concurrent alerts, imperfect detectors, and escalation due to failed response 
actions. It can also deal with unanticipated alerts and unknown vulnerabilities in the system components. 
Each of these is of critical importance in an intrusion tolerance system applied to a real-world system. 
3.  ADEPTS is demonstrated on a realistic distributed testbed with realistic transactions and attack scenarios. 
However, the work presented here does not have as its goal any of the following: intrusion detection for an e-
commerce system, provide a methodology for structuring or composing an e-commerce system, design novel 
response actions for specific services in an e-commerce system, or provide a shrink-wrapped intrusion tolerance 
system to make an e-commerce system resilient to specific classes of attacks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to related research. Section 3 presents the design 
of ADEPTS. Section 4 describes the implementation and the e-commerce testbed on which ADEPTS is deployed. 
Section 5 presents the experiments and the results. Section 0 concludes the paper with mention of some future 
work.  
2 Related  Research 
The devastating impact of computer security attacks to today’s electronic world has spurred enormous interest 
in intrusion detection research, both from academic and commercial quarters. In order to guarantee the   5
requirement for continuous availability of the services, it is also important to consider how the system reacts once 
the intrusion is detected. The majority of current IDSs stops with flagging alarms and relies on manual response 
by the security administrator or system administrator. This results in delays between the detection of the intrusion 
and the response which may range from minutes to months. Cohen showed using simulated attack scenarios that 
given a ten hour delay from detection, 80% of the attacks succeed and given thirty hours, almost all the attacks 
succeed irrespective of the skill level of the defending system’s administrator [8]. This insight has led to research 
in survivable systems engineering pioneered by CERT at CMU [9] and followed by several other researchers 
[26],[27],[28]. Survivability is loosely defined as the capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely 
manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents ([10],[11]). The researchers identify the four key 
properties of survivable systems, namely, resistance to attacks, recognition of attacks and damage, recovery of 
essential and full services after attack, and adaptation and evolution to reduce effectiveness of future attacks. The 
part of the ADEPTS system presented in this paper is motivated by the requirement to provide the second and the 
fourth properties. 
Intrusion response systems (IRS) can be considered to cover the last three properties and are therefore suitable 
for comparison with ADEPTS. A majority of the IRSs are static in nature in that they provide a set of 
preprogrammed responses that the administrator can choose from in initiating a response, e.g., [16],[35],[37],[38]. 
This may reduce the time gap between detection and response, but still leaves a potentially unbounded window of 
vulnerability. The holy grail is an IRS that can respond to an attack automatically. A handful of systems provide 
adaptive responses. In [17], the authors propose a network model that allows an IRS to evaluate the effect of a 
response on the network services. The system chooses in a greedy manner the response that minimizes the 
penalty. There are some studies which present taxonomy of offensive and defensive responses to aid in selection 
of coherent responses in an automated response system ([13],[18],[19]). Cooperating Security Managers (CSM) 
[12] is a distributed and host-based intrusion detection and response system. CSM proactively detects intrusions 
and reactively responds to them using the Fisch DC&A taxonomy [13]. It uses the suspicion level of the user as 
the only determining factor in the choice of response. A second system called EMERALD ([14],[15]) uses two 
factors in determining the response – the amount of evidence furnished to support the claim of intrusion and the 
severity of the response. None of the systems uses record of the past performance of the intrusion detection   6
system as measured by the incidence of false positives and false negatives. None keeps track of the success or 
failure of the deployed response nor provide a framework for easily incorporating these factors in the automated 
response determination. Another adaptive IRS is the Adaptive, Agent-based Intrusion Response System (AAIRS) 
([20][21]). The work provides a good framework on which the IRS can be built. However, it does not provide any 
of the system-level techniques and algorithms that will be required for the AAIRS to work in practice. There is 
some previous work on protecting distributed systems against flooding based distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks in an automated manner through rate limiting ([22][23],[24],[25]).  
Fault trees have been used extensively in root cause analysis in fault tolerant systems (see [29] for pointers). 
They have also been used to a limited extent in secure system design ([30],[31],[32]). We use an attack graph 
representation with nodes as intermediate goals since the same intermediate goals show up in several attack paths. 
Graph theoretic approaches to modeling the temporal nature of security attributes is found in [33],[34]. The notion 
of privilege graphs introduced in [34] has some similarity to our I-GRAPH. However, they represent only attacks 
launched by escalating the privilege level of the attacker and the arcs are marked with weights representing the 
difficulty of the privilege escalation. The weights are dependent on several factors, such as the expertise and 
resources of the attacker, and therefore difficult to predict.  
3  Design of ADEPTS  
3.1 Overview 
The goal of ADEPTS is to monitor and track intrusions as they occur in real-time and deploy various wide-ranging 
responses to contain and restrict the spread of attacks in the system. The system is subdivided into ADEPTS and 
the payload system, which includes the embedded detectors. The deployment of ADEPTS requires no modification 
to the payload and no access to its source code. The I-GRAPH models the paths an attacker can traverse to reach 
certain goals that adversely affect the payload. Our motive in designing ADEPTS is to proactively prevent an 
attacker from moving from one attack goal node to another, by responding appropriately at specific nodes. Here 
we give a high-level description of the process flow shown in Figure 1. As an alert comes into ADEPTS, it is 
mapped to nodes in the I-GRAPH followed by the execution of the response determination algorithm.   0
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Figure 1: Overall process flow in ADEPTS showing the 
different stages starting from alert being flagged in the 
payload to response(s) being deployed 
Throughout ADEPTS, three policy levels are 
used to control the behavior of the relevant 
algorithms  − aggressive, moderate, and 
conservative. The three policies can be 
abstracted to represent a ratio of missed alarms 
to false alarms, with the aggressive policy 
having the lowest ratio and the conservative 
policy having the highest ratio. 
3.2 I-GRAPH Structure 
The I-GRAPH, is used as the underlying representation for knowledge about intrusions, as they spread 
achieving progressively wider set of goals. 
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Figure 2: A section of the I-GRAPH referenced in later 
algorithms, with OR, AND, and Quorum edges present. 
  In the I-GRAPH representation, each intrusion 
goal is represented by one node in the graph. The 
final goal of the intrusion may be disrupting some 
high level system functionality, such as “Denial of 
service achieved against the online store”. This final 
step will be achieved through multiple small to 
moderate sized steps. A successful execution of a 
step is looked upon as achieving an intermediate 
intrusion goal and captured as an I-GRAPH node.
The intrusion goals have dependency relationships between one another. For example, in order to corrupt the data 
in the backend database server, one may need to exploit a vulnerability in the front-end web server. The edges are 
used to model this kind of dependency.   
In the I-GRAPH, nodes are categorized into three types – OR node, AND node, and Quorum node. For an OR 
node to be achieved, any of its child nodes needs to be achieved, while for an AND node, all the child nodes have 
to be achieved. For a Quorum node, one can assign a Minimum Required Quorum (MRQ) on it, which represents 
the minimum number of child nodes whose goals need to be achieved in order for the Quorum node to be   8
achieved. Conforming to the traditional definition of quorums in fault tolerant systems, one may think MRQ as 
the minimum number of service replicas whose loss will affect the functionality of the service. An example 
fragment of the I-GRAPH used in our payload system, a distributed e-commerce system, is shown in Figure 2.  
3.3 I-GRAPH Generation 
A key issue in the usability of ADEPTS is the ease with which the I-GRAPH can be generated and updated as 
system configuration changes or new vulnerabilities are brought to light. We employ a semi-automated method 
called Portable I-GRAPH Generation (PIG) for this. PIG requires two inputs − vulnerability descriptions and 
system services description (SNet). Of the two inputs, the SNet is target system dependent. This is a directed 
graph, in which each node represents an individual service in the target system and an edge from node A to node 
B represents an intrusion-centric channel. An intrusion-centric channel means if A is compromised, then the 
intrusion can spread to B through the channel. An intrusion-centric channel may be of five kinds – (i) DOS 
channel: if the source service is subjected to a successful DoS attack, then the destination service can also be 
subjected to DoS; (ii) Network channel: there is a network data connection between A and B; (iii) Shared file 
channel; (iv) Shared memory channel; (v) Super channel: which combines the functionality of all of the above. 
The SNet is currently manually created for the target system, though in the future, some tool which can perform 
service discovery and interaction discovery (each an area of current research [50]) can perform this task 
automatically.   
The second input to PIG is the target independent vulnerability descriptions. Information on the vulnerabilities 
can be obtained by querying the common vulnerability databases, such as CERT, Bugtraq, and CERIAS-VDB. 
For use in PIG, the vulnerability is specified through four fields – (i) Name: which is primarily useful for human 
reference. (ii) Affected service: which gives the service(s) in the SNet affected by the vulnerability; (iii) 
Manifestation: this is a Boolean expression in disjunctive normal form composed of five elementary 
manifestations, namely, leaking of information, execution of arbitrary code, incorrect behavior of service, DoS, 
and service termination. (iv) Dependent vulnerability and services: which denotes the dependence on other 
vulnerabilities and services that have to be compromised to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability definitions 
are analogous to the virus definitions used in anti-virus products. They can be developed either by the ADEPTS 
developer or by a third party. The basic idea behind the I-GRAPH generation algorithm is that when a vulnerability   9
description is read in, a corresponding node in the I-GRAPH is created, thus creating a one-to-one map. In the next 
step, the algorithm checks for nodes in the I-GRAPH that this newly created node can get connected to. For this 
step, it relies on information from both the SNet and the vulnerability descriptions to decide whether spread of the 
intrusion is possible from the newly created node to the other nodes and vice-versa.  
3.4  Algorithms for Determining Response Locations 
3.4.1  CCI Computation Algorithm 
The goal of the algorithm is to determine, based on the received alerts from the detectors, which of the I-
GRAPH goal nodes are likely to have been achieved. Each detector provides confidence values for its alerts, 
termed alert confidence. If the detector does not provide an inbuilt confidence value with the alert, then the alert 
confidence value is set to one. When a detector flags an intrusion, the alerts are placed in the I-GRAPH nodes with 
the corresponding intrusion event. The Compromised Confidence Index (CCI) of a node in the I-GRAPH is a 
measure of the likelihood that the node has been achieved. It is computed based on the alert confidence 
corresponding to the node and the CCI of its immediate children nodes. Mathematically, the CCI of a node is 
given by 
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i
i
f
ff
⎧⎫
⎪⎪ =′ ( ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ ′ ⎩⎭
 
where CCIi corresponds to the CCI of the i
th child. 
max(CCI )                    , OR edges
min(CCI )                     , AND edges
Mean(CCI   |  CCI   ) , quorum met
0                                       , quorum not met
i
ii
i f
Ν
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪ ′=⎨
⎪ >τ ⎧ ⎪⎨ ⎪⎩ ⎩
 
where τN is a threshold per node. 
The intuition is that for an OR edge, the parent node can be achieved if any of its children nodes is achieved 
and therefore the likelihood is the maximum of that of all of its children. For an AND edge, all the children nodes 
have to be achieved and therefore the likelihood is as much as the least likely child node. For Quorum edges, if 
the quorum is not met, then the higher goal is not achieved, but if met, the likelihood of it being achieved only 
depends on the children nodes that have achieved the quorum. The function  f allows various weights to be 
assigned to determine the relative importance placed to the alert or the position of the node in the I-GRAPH. For 
simplicity, the function for the current design of ADEPTS is the statistical mean.   10
When new alerts arrive, the nodes corresponding to these alerts are passed to this algorithm, the I-GRAPH is 
traversed in breadth-first-search (BFS) order starting from the nodes corresponding to the new alerts, and the 
CCIs of the nodes are computed until each reachable node has been traversed at most once. The advantage of such 
a traversal allows us to convert the I-GRAPH into an I-DAG and thereby avoid cycling infinitely through the graph. 
The disadvantage of such a traversal is that some causal linkage of events between nodes will be ignored, which 
reduces the accuracy of the CCI computation. This disadvantage is not expected to be very significant since the 
temporal order of alerts is also often the causal order. 
The alert confidence used to update the CCI is chosen based on policy. For an aggressive policy, the maximum 
alert confidence in the alert queue is used; for a moderate policy, the maximum of a subset of alert confidences 
based on the most recent alerts is chosen; for a conservative policy, the alert confidence corresponding to the most 
recent alert is chosen. The alert confidence provided by a detector has to be moderated by the confidence on the 
detector. ADEPTS has a mechanism to determine if a detector misses alarms and adjust the detector confidence 
accordingly. Qualitatively, if ADEPTS sees that for a given node ni, its children nodes as well as parent nodes are 
flagged but ni is not, then it anticipates probabilistically that the detectors have missed flagging the alert.  
3.4.2  Response Set Computation Algorithm 
The purpose of this algorithm is to determine the nodes in the I-GRAPH where current attacks will most likely 
spread to. This will allow the response algorithm to deploy appropriate responses at those locations. The I-GRAPH 
is traversed in reverse order of the CCI computation algorithm, continuing until all reachable nodes are traversed 
at most once. During the traversal, each node is labeled as one of: (i) Strong Candidate (SC), if CCI N >τ ; (ii) 
Weak Candidate (WC), if CCI N ≤τ but further traversal across only AND edges can reach a SC node; (iii) Very 
Weak Candidate (VWC), if CCI N ≤τ  but further traversal across any type of edge can reach a SC node; (iv) 
Non-Candidate (NC), otherwise. If the CCI of a node is computed to be greater than  Ν τ , the system concludes the 
node has been achieved. Therefore the SC label on a node is a strong indicator that the node has been achieved, 
while the WC or VWC label indicates smaller likelihoods of nodes being achieved due to evidence from their 
parents. 
Next, some nodes are placed in a response set, indicating to the response system where responses should be 
deployed. For an aggressive policy, all SC nodes, and WC and VWC nodes which have at least one immediate   11
NC parent node are placed in the response set. For a moderate policy, all SC and WC nodes that have at least one 
immediate NC parent node are placed in the response set. For a conservative policy, all SC nodes that have at 
least one immediate NC parent node are placed in the response set. The aggressive, moderate, and conservative 
policies provide increasingly less disruption as well as protection. 
Referencing Figure 2, suppose the CCIs of nodes 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are 0.8, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4, and 0.7, respectively, 
and the other nodes have negligible CCI. Then a possible partial traversal order would be 7, 6, 1, 5, and 4. 
Suppose the threshold Ν τ= 0 . 5 , then node 7 will be a SC node, nodes 6, 1, 5, 4 VWC nodes, and all other nodes 
NC nodes. For an aggressive policy, nodes 7 and 2 would be in the response set; for a moderate or conservative 
policy, only node 7 would be in the response set. 
3.5  Response Process: Response Repository 
The deployment of the response is achieved by a Response Repository, a Response Control Center, and 
distributed Response Execution Agents. The Response Repository stores the responses available for deployment in 
a payload system. Each response in the repository consists of an opcode and one or more operands, with 
wildcards allowed for each. The opcode is the response command, and the operands are the different parameters 
that need to be specified in order to execute the response. For example, the opcode for the response command of 
dropping incoming packets from a remote IP to a local port is DROP_INPUT, and the corresponding operands are 
REMOTE_IP and LOCAL_PORT. The opcode and the operands together make up a complete response 
command. The response structure allows ADEPTS fine-grained customization of the available responses.  
3.6  Response Control Center    
The opcode is selected based on the ability of the opcode to cut off the attack-centric channels as defined in 
Section 3.4.  The Response Set Computation algorithm (Section 3.4.2) sends to the Response Control Center the 
list of I-GRAPH nodes, which are candidates for the deployment of responses. For each node, the Response 
Control Center selects a set of candidate response opcodes that can be used to prevent attacks from spreading via 
the node’s outgoing intrusion-centric channels. The choice is determined by the type of the channel. For example, 
the file access based opcodes, such as DENY_FILE_ACCESS or DISABLE_WRITE, are selected as candidate 
response opcodes if an outgoing shared file channel is present.     12
After the opcodes have been chosen, the Response Control Center generates a list of complete response 
commands by collecting suitable operands. For this, it examines the alert events stored in the alert queue of the I-
GRAPH node and uses them to fill in the operands that are required by the selected opcodes. An opcode can be 
combined with multiple operands during this phase. For example, for an opcode KILL_PROCESS, the control 
center may extract PID#1 from alert event#1 and PID#2 from alert event #2, both in the alert queue. Then, the 
response command KILL_PROCESS PID#1, PID#2 is generated for subsequent evaluation.   
3.6.1  Pick Responses to Deploy  
For each selected response command, the Response Control Center computes the Response Index (RI). The RI 
takes into the account the estimated effectiveness of the response to the particular attack, measured by the 
Effectiveness Index (EI), and the perceived disruptiveness of the response to legitimate users of the system, 
measured by the Disruptiveness Index (DI).  The EI and the DI are both specific to the response command 
(opcode-operand combination) and the node in the I-GRAPH to which the response is mapped. The RI is given by 
.. RIa E Ib D I =−, where a and b are deployment parameters. 
Note that EI of an identical response command may differ for different attacks that map to different I-GRAPH 
nodes. For example, blocking port 65000 or 16660 may be useful to block the stacheldraht DDoS attack tool [42] 
but is unlikely to be effective for the TFN DDoS attack tool [43]. The control center chooses the response with the 
highest RI among the candidate responses, with a threshold being used to suppress a response that falls below it. 
This ensures that ineffective or highly disruptive responses are not deployed. If no response is chosen for a 
particular node, then the next higher level node is searched for possible responses.  
In the event that the payload system is under multiple concurrent attacks, multiple alert events are mapped to 
the same I-GRAPH node. ADEPTS deploys responses for different alerts received in a short span of time, which 
may correspond to each individual attack instance. A heuristic to distinguish different concurrent attacks, 
involving clustering source IP addresses, destination IP addresses, source ports, destination ports, user accounts 
and initiated processes, proposed in [21], can be easily integrated into ADEPTS.    
3.6.2  Contradiction, Equivalence, Subset, and Super Set Relation between Responses 
Before initiating execution of the chosen responses, the Response Control Center identifies the relations 
between the active responses and the pending responses and the validity of the response itself. The newly selected   13
response is suppressed and a new response command with the second highest RI is considered if one of the 
following conditions holds: the new command is a subset or the equivalent of an active response, the new 
response contradicts an active response, or an inconsistent response has been generated. An example of an 
inconsistent response is the command to block incoming UDP packets toward port 80 is inconsistent since HTTP 
packets directed to port 80 transmit under TCP protocol. If there is overlap between the new response and an 
active response, the ideal strategy would be to deploy the non-overlapping part of the new response. Since it is 
difficult to extract subsets out of a response in an automated manner, we enforce the design choice on the 
responses in ADEPTS that they are all non-overlapping. This is possible to achieve because of the fine granularity 
of the responses. 
3.6.3  Handling unknown alerts 
In a real-world deployment, it is quite probable that the I-GRAPH for the payload system is incomplete. Thus, 
ADEPTS would be unable to map an incoming alert from a detector to a node in the I-GRAPH. To handle this 
situation, ADEPTS has the provision of a general I-GRAPH node per host. The alert would be mapped to the general 
I-GRAPH node for the host that is the destination of the attack as is easily deducible from the alert. Since the 
general node represents unknown vulnerabilities, it is not connected to any other nodes in the I-GRAPH. Therefore, 
ADEPTS cannot follow the strategy of traversing I-GRAPH edges as in Section 3.6.1. In this case, the Response 
Control Center can simply report the instance to the administrator and take one of a set of pre-specified general 
responses. The general responses are the commands that would be possible to deploy with very little knowledge 
of the operands, such as killing a process (need process ID), shutting down a service (need service ID), or 
restarting a host (need host ID). 
3.7  Deploying Response & Providing Feedback 
Feedback to the response system is crucial for ADEPTS, providing the runtime mechanism to bias response 
choices in favor of those that have been effective in the past. This feedback is provided by dynamically varying 
the EI of the response. After a response has been deployed by ADEPTS, the feedback system checks to see if any 
active response action is deployed on an edge that can be used to reach a node in the currently computed response 
set. If such a response action exists, it is indication that the response action possibly failed and its EI is decreased.   14
The amount by which the EI of the response is decreased depends on whether the response is on an AND edge, 
OR edge, or Quorum edge to the node in the response set. If it is on an AND edge, then it is certain that the 
response failed and thus the node was achieved. Therefore, the EI is decreased by a fixed fraction for responses on 
all the edges. If the response is on an OR or Quorum edge, then the EI is decreased in the proportion of the CCI 
values of the nodes, the maximum decrease being the same as in the AND case. When a response's Time To Live 
(TTL) expires or when an administrator manually deactivates a response, the EI of the response action is 
increased by a fixed percentage under the intuition that the response was successful since further alerts were not 
observed. 
Referencing Figure 2, suppose an active response is present on the edge between node 1 and 7, and node 10 is 
in the response set. Also suppose the CCI of nodes 1, 6, 7, and 8 are 0.8, 0.3, 0.6, 0.1 respectively and the fixed 
fraction to decrease is 0.2. Then for the active response,  0.6
0.2 0.125
0.6 0.1
new old old EI EI EI
0.8
=− × × =−
+ 0.8+0.3
. 
4  Implementation of ADEPTS & Testbed 
4.1  Description of E-Commerce Application 
Figure 3 depicts the testbed that we use for experiments on ADEPTS. The payload system mimics an e-
Commerce webstore, which has two Apache web servers running webstore applications, which are based on 
Cubecart [44] and are written in the PHP scripting language. In the backend, there’s a MySQL database which 
stores all the store’s information, which includes products inventory, products description, customer accounts, and 
order history. There are two other organizations with which the webstore interacts – a Bank and a Warehouse. The 
Bank is a home-grown application which verifies credit card requests from the webstore. The Warehouse is also a 
home-grown application, which takes shipping requests from the webstore, checks inventory, applies charges on 
the customer’s credit card account, and ships the product. The clients submit transactions to the webstore through 
a browser. Some important transactions are given in Table 1.    15
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Figure 3: Layout of e-commerce testbed for the experiments on ADEPTS 
Name Description  Services  involved  Weight 
Browse  webstore  Customer uses web browser to access webstore and browse the 
products available 
Apache, MySQL  10 
Add merchandise to 
shopping cart 
Customer adds products to shopping cart  Apache, MySQL   10 
Place  order  Customer can input credit card information, submit orders, and 
webstore will authenticate credit card with bank 
Apache, MySQL, 
bank  
10 
Charge credit card  Warehouse charges credit card through bank when order is shipped  Warehouse, bank   5 
Admin work  Admins/webmasters can modify various source codes  Variable  10 
Table 1: List of important transactions in e-commerce system 
We set certain security goals for the system, the complement of which are specified in Table 2, along with the 
weights. Thus adding the word “prevent” before each gives the goal. The attached weights to the transactions and 
security goals are used for survivability computation in Section 5. 
Illegal read of file (20)  Corruption of MySQL database (70)  Unauthorized credit card charges (80) 
Illegal write to file (30)  Confidentiality leak of customer information 
stored in MySQL database (100) 
Cracked administrator password (90) 
Illegal process being run (50)  Unauthorized orders created or shipped (80) 
Table 2: List of security goals for e-commerce testbed 
4.2 Detectors 
For our testbed, multiple detectors which communicate with ADEPTS through secure channels are used. We 
use two off-the-shelf detectors − Snort [35] and Libsafe [45], and create three home-grown detectors. Snort is 
used for detecting intrusion patterns in network traffic while Libsafe is used to detect buffer overflows in 
protected C-library calls. We create a kernel-based File Access Monitor, which can detect file access attempts of 
monitored processes and compare these access attempts against preset rules to detect illegitimate activity. Also, 
we create a Transaction Response Monitor, which monitors the transaction response time of the webstore using 
requests from the Apache Benchmark [46]. Finally, there is an Abnormal Account Activity Detector at the Bank, 
which detects abnormal account activities such as excessive number of credit card transactions on one account.   16
The detectors used are all imperfect ones, with the possibility of missed alarms and false alarms. The detectors are 
not customized to the attack scenarios that the system is tested with. For the off-the-shelf detectors, the rules are 
taken from the public distribution, while for the others, the rules are created by a researcher separate from the 
group that generates the attack scenarios. 
4.3 Attack  Scenarios 
The ADEPTS deployment is tested with different attack scenarios classified into three categories − leaking 
information, illegal transaction, and DoS. Each attack scenario consists of a set of attack steps, with an ultimate 
high-level goal. Each step of the attack scenario may be detected by none, one, or more of the detectors. A 
detector vector with the elements (Snort, Libsafe, FileAccess, Bank Monitor., Transaction Response Monitor) is 
assigned to each step of the attack scenario. A ‘1’ means that step can be detected by the corresponding detector. 
We show in Table 3 one sample scenario from each category – Scenario 0 is leaking of user information in the 
database (Leaking information), Scenario 1 is placing unauthorized orders (Illegal transaction), and Scenario 8 is 
vandalize webstore (DoS). 
Steps  Scenario 0  Scenario 1  Scenario 8 
0  Exploit Apache mod buffer 
overflow. 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
Use php_mime_split (CVE-2002-0081) buffer 
overflow to insert malicious code into Apache. 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
ModSSL Buffer overflow in Apache. 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
1  Insert malicious code. 
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
'ls' to list webstore document root and identify the 
script code informing the warehouse to do shipments. 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 
A shell is created with Apache privilege. 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 
2  Ip/port scanning to find 
vulnerable SQL server. 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
Send shipping request to warehouse and craft the 
request form so that a warehouse side buffer overrrun 
bug fills the form with a victim's credit card number.  
(0, 1, 0, 0, 0) 
Issue crontab command to exploit a 
vunerability in cron daemon for creating a 
root privilage shell. 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 
3  Buffer overflow MYSQL to 
create a shell (/bin/sh). 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 
Unauthorized orders are made. (0, 0, 0, 1, 0)  Root privilege shell created out of the 
vulnerable cron daemon. (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
4  Use malicious shell to 
steal information stored in 
MySQL. (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 
  Corrupt the data stored in web server 
document root. (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 
Table 3: Attack steps for three attack scenarios used in experiments with ADEPTS 
We also test ADEPTS with other attack scenarios involving buffer overflow attacks to steal client info, and 
other DoS attack scenarios entailing memory exhaustion in the Apache mime handling components or DDoS 
through huge number of legitimate transactions, such as product search. The entire I-GRAPH automatically 
generated by the PIG algorithm consists of 57 nodes and 1148 edges and is too large to be shown. A fragment of 
the I-GRAPH has been shown in Figure 2.   17
4.4  Response Repository for E-Commerce Testbed 
Four types of response commands are included in the Response Repository − general, file, network, and 
denial-of-service types. The general-type commands can be deployed to block any types of intrusion-centric 
channels in the I-GRAPH, corresponding to the super channel. The other types of commands have a one-to-one 
map to the kinds of intrusion channels introduced in Section 3.3. The implementation of the file-type commands 
is achieved by using the Linux Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) 2.2.0 [38]. The implementation of the network-
type commands is performed by using iptables [47]. The general type commands are killing a process and 
restarting or shutting down a service or a host. The file-type commands are to deny any access to a file, or 
selectively disable read, write, or execute access. The network-type commands are to block incoming or outgoing 
network connections, parameterized by source or destination port, IP, or protocol. The DOS-type commands are 
to limit the rates of various types of packets, such as SYN, ICMP echo, ICMP host not reachable, and SYN-ACK.  
5  Experiments and Results 
We perform three sets of experiments demonstrating the following (i) effect of attack scenarios on 
survivability with and without ADEPTS, (ii) the ability of ADEPTS to deploy responses as the speed of propagation 
of the attack varies, (iii) the adaptation in ADEPTS in choosing responses. All these experiments are conducted 
with ADEPTS using moderate policy with actual attack scenarios on the e-commerce testbed. For experiment 1 and 
2, we define the survivability based on the high level transactions and security goals. The metric thus shows the 
effect of ADEPTS on the high level functioning of the e-commerce system. 
 Survivability 1000 unavailable transactions failed security goals =− − ∑∑ . 
When a transaction became unavailable or the security goal is violated, the survivability drops by its 
corresponding weight, which was given in Table 1 and Table 2. Transactions become unavailable due to ADEPTS 
responses, such as rebooting a host, or attacks. Security goals may be violated due to the successful execution of 
an attack step. If a security goal is violated multiple times during an attack, then each violation causes a decrease 
in the survivability.    18
5.1  Experiment 1: Effect of Attack Scenarios on Survivability 
The goal of experiment 1 is to show the comparative performance of ADEPTS in maintaining the survivability 
of the e-commerce system with respect to having no responses and only local responses. Three different attack 
scenarios are executed and the survivability calculated at each step of the attack scenario. For the local response 
case, the responses that came with the deployed detectors are used – Snort (IP blocking) and bank monitor (freeze 
credit card). 
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Figure 4: Survivability with attack steps with ADEPTS, local, and no response, and no response (a) 
scenario 0; (b) scenario 1 
For the leak of information attack (Figure 4(a)), ADEPTS far outperforms the other two. The File Access 
Monitor detects a malicious shell being created with Apache privileges while Snort detects an Apache SSL 
module buffer overflow packet. Consequently, ADEPTS deploys aggressive responses to kill the process and block 
all following incoming packets from the attacker. The inability of the local response implemented by Snort to drop 
the IP packets in time causes the attack to continue to spread. For the illegal transaction attack (Figure 4(b)), the 
performance of the local response is noticeably worse than ADEPTS. ADEPTS deploys a successful response of 
disallowing shell commands with Apache privileges, earlier than the local response at the bank monitor. For the 
distributed denial of service attack (Figure 5), the graph shows the inability of any of the setups to respond 
effectively to the attack. The responses deployed by ADEPTS to limit the overall incoming packet rate, such as, 
blocking packets from the IP address with the highest rate of packet transmission, allowed for a slight decrease in 
the effectiveness of the DoS.   19
5.2  Experiment 2: Effect of Propagation Speed on Survivability 
The experiment inspects the relationship between the ability of ADEPTS to protect the payload system and the 
attack propagation speed. We vary the delay between the attack steps in scenario 0 between 0-7 s. This could 
simulate a variety of factors, such as the attacker’s skill level, condition of the network, difficulty of an attack 
step, etc. Figure 6 shows the survivability with different attack propagation speeds. The legend ‘0004’ means there 
is a delay of zero seconds before attack step 0 is begun, between steps 0 and 1, and 1 and 2, while there is a delay 
of 4 s for all subsequent steps. We see that ADEPTS performs well with delays ≥ 4 s since the attack is stopped in 
the very first step. If however, the first step has zero delay, then ADEPTS is only able to block the attack at a later 
step, leading to a decreased survivability. With no delay at all between the steps, ADEPTS is only able to block the 
attack at the last step, which is still better than the no response case. In all cases, ADEPTS can maintain the 
survivability at a constant level once the blocking is successful. 
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Figure 5: Survivability with attack steps with 
ADEPTS, local response, and no response (scenario 4)
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Figure 6: Effect of attack propagation speed on 
survivability with ADEPTS
5.3  Experiment 3: Adaptation of Response Mechanism in ADEPTS 
Here we demonstrate the adaptive nature of ADEPTS through which it can change the response strategy as an 
attack escalates. Scenario 8, having 5 steps, with delay characteristic ‘00015’ is used for demonstrating the 
process. This experiment is composed of multiple runs of scenario 8 (we show runs 1, 3, and 6). We see in Run 1, 
the initial choice of responses is poor (‘X’ by response implies failed) and the final step of scenario 8 is reached, 
where the attacker can create a root privilege shell and tamper with Apache’s HTTP documents. In Run 3, after a 
series of EI tuning from Runs 1 and 2, the response of rebooting Apache is deployed in step 2. In Run 6, the 
response of rebooting Apache is further moved ahead to step 1. The farther ahead of the final attack goal (step 8)   20
that the attack is blocked, the higher is the safety that the goal has not been reached. Thus, the choice of responses 
in run 6 is the best and ADEPTS is seen to improve its response choices through observing multiple attacks. 
R1 Block port 443 from attacker’s 
src IP 
R3 Block attacker’s source IP  R5 Restart Aapache  R7 Deny access to crontab command and 
kill process if still running 
R2 Kill the Apache privilege shell  R4 Kill crontab process  R6 Reboot Apache’s host machine  R8 Set Apache’s HTTP document 
directory to READONLY 
Run 1 
Step Attack  impacts 
0  Apache MOD_SSL Buffer Overflow 
1  Apache Privilege Shell Created 
 X  R1 
X R2 
2  Executing crontab command 
EI [R1] 1.1 → 1.072497 
EI [R2] 1.1 → 1.058745 
X R3 
X R4 
3  Put malicious data into Apache user’s crontab 
EI [R2] 1.058745 → 1.024404 
EI [R4] 1.1 → 1.064321 
EI [R3] 1.1 → 1.076214 
EI [R1] 1.072497 → 1.049305 
X R5 
 
4  Root privilege Shell created out of cron daemon 
5  Via the root shell, the attacker tampers with 
files under http document directory. 
EI [R2] 1.024404 → 0.99328 
EI [R4] 1.064321 → 1.031984 
EI [R5] 1.1 → 1.077720 
EI [R3] 1.076214 → 1.054415 
EI [R1] 1.049305 → 1.028052 
O R6 
X R7 
X R8 
 
Attack Stopped 
EI [R8] 1.1 → 1.21  
EI [R7] 1.1 → 1.21 
EI [R6] from 1.1 → 1.21 
Run 3 
Step Attack  impacts 
0  Apache MOD_SSL Buffer Overflow 
1  Apache Privilege Shell Created 
 X  R1 
X R7 
2  Executing crontab command 
EI [R7] 1.21 → 1.164620 
EI [R1] 0.96081 → 0.936787 
O R6 
X R4 
3  Put malicious data into Apache user’s crontab 
EI [R7] 1.16462 → 1.126844 
EI [R4] 1.1 → 1.064321 
EI [R1] 0.936787 → 0.916530 
EI [R6] 1.331 → 1.302219 
X R3 
 
Attack Stopped 
EI [R3] up from 1.01072 → 1.111792 
Run 6 
0  Apache MOD_SSL Buffer overflow 
1  Apache privilege shell created 
  O R6 
O R7 
Attack Stopped 
EI [R7] 1.1 → 1.21 
EI [R6] 1.401466 → 1.541612 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
In the paper we have presented the design and implementation of an automated intrusion containment system 
called ADEPTS. ADEPTS uses a graph of intrusion goals called I-GRAPH. It provides a method to determine the 
possible path of spread of the intrusion, appropriate services where to deploy the response, and appropriately 
choose the response. ADEPTS is demonstrated on an e-commerce system with real attack scenarios. 
We are currently investigating ways to synthesize new responses at runtime from the repository, designing 
protocols for handling concurrent attacks, distinguishing between attacks, and evaluating the convergence of its 
adaptation feature.   21
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